Europe '92: Environmental policy in an integrated market by Siebert, Horst
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Siebert, Horst
Working Paper
Europe '92: Environmental policy in an
integrated market
Kiel Working Papers, No. 365
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Siebert, Horst (1989) : Europe '92: Environmental policy in an integrated
market, Kiel Working Papers, No. 365, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/502Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Working Paper No. 365




Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342-0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
D-2300 Kiel, Dusternbrooker Weg 120
Working Paper No. 365





The author, not the Kiel Institute of World Economics, is
solely responsible for the contents and distribution of each
Kiel Working Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticisms and
suggestions directly to the author and to clear any quota-
tions with him.
ISSN 0342-0787Europe '92. Environmental Policy in an Integrated Market.
Horst Siebert
1. The main intention of the initiative for the completion
of the Common Market in '92 is to abolish segmentations
between national markets. These segmentations are caused by
- border controls due to differences in the systems
of indirect taxation (and due to statistical reasons),
- border control as a means of national regulation
with respect to product norms,
- differences in market entry conditions among
European countries, and
- other factors such as market distortions through
subsidies.
A larger market will provide more opportunities of cost
minimization for firms; it will allow firms to exploit
economies of scale and economies of scope; it will improve
the international division of labor including intra-
industry trade, and it will stimulate economic growth in
Europe. Moreover, the EC-initiative will make it harder for
national regulations to persist.
2. From the perspective of environmental quality, the
problem arises whether the economic stimulation through
integration will be connected with a loss of environmental
quality. The Cecchini Report stresses the stimulative
aspects of economic integration, but it neglects the
environmental dimension.I. Institutional Competition
3. As a general principle, the completion of the European
Market will not be attempted by prior harmonization of
national regulations, but by a competitive process among
national institutional settings. The main reason for the
open ended competitive approach is that prior harmonization
has proven to be impractical in the past. Moreover, a
competitive process will be more imaginative than a pure
planning process.
4. For the commodity market, the Creme-de-Cassis verdict of
the European Court has set the stage for a competitive
process: A product legally brought to market in one country
can be sold in any other country. The rule of the country
of origin can be applied to different rates of value added
taxes if border controls no longer exist and if the value
added tax is no longer reimbursed for exports within
Europe. The country with a high rate of a value added tax
competes with a country with a lower tax rate. In
principle, the country of origin principle also relates to
the market entry of firms. A firm being licensed in one
nation is allowed to operate in other nations as well. This
philosophy of the rule of the country of origin will be
extended to the service industry (banking, insurance,
transportation). A firm of the service industry being
allowed in one market also has access to the other national
markets. This means that the regulation of the country of
origin is applied to a firm operating in another country.
5. The advantage of the country of origin principle is that
households and firms will react to differences between
national regulations. The common market will provide many
opportunities for arbitrage, for instance for consumers
having the option to buy in different countries or for the
location of firms. Arbitrage, however, will put pressure on
national regulations to be revised and to be harmonized in
an open political process. Arbitrage of households and3
firms is an important ingredient of the process of
institutional competition.
II. Decentralizing Environmental Policy
6. Can the country of origin principle be applied in the
case of environmental policy and can we rely on a compe-
titive process between national environmental regulations?
The advantage of such an approach would be that
- ex ante harmonization of environmental regulation
on a European scale would not be necessary,
- environmental policy can be implemented in a decen-
tralized way which is appealing to the federalist
organizational structure of Europe and
- the subsidiary principle can be applied allowing
for different national preferences and better infor-
mation at the lower organizational level.
7. It should be noted that a decentralized environmental
policy can mean two different things (Siebert 1985):
- A differentiation in the environmental quality as a
target among the individual nations.
- A differentiation of environmental policy instruments
expressing environmental scarcity even if identical
quality targets prevail.
A differentiation of environmental quality among European
nations may be combined with a common minimum European
quality target allowing stricter national targets.
With respect to environmental policy instruments we have to
distinguish between a short-run and a long-run analysis. In
the short run, environmental scarcity reflects the
industrial mix of a region, the state of art of abatement
etc., and then environmental policy instruments may differ4
between regions due to a difference in environmental
scarcity. In the long run, firms may relocate, abatement
technology may change and policy instruments may be similar
between reninns. between regions.
8. The answer to the role of a decentralized approach of
environmental policy in Europe depends on the casuistics of
the environmental problem at hand. We distinguish the
following main cases (Siebert 1987, p. 19,20).
- Emissions from production (stationary sources) where
the environment can be treated as a purely national
good. The environment is used as a national receptacle
of emissions as well as a national public good of con-
sumption .
- Emissions from consumption (stationary sources).
- Waste disposal activities.
- Vintage damages.
- Emissions from non-stationary sources.
- International spillover. Pollutants are diffused via
environmental systems ( air, rivers, biodiffusion)
across national borders.
- Global environmental systems (of a more or less
European or even world-wide scale) such as the Medi-
terranean or the North Sea. National emissions are
discharged into a public good common to more than one
nation.
- Pollutants contained in consumption goods and direct-
ly affecting the consumer.
- Environmental accidents of the Seveso type.
III. Continuous Emissions from Production and Consumption;
Stationary Sources
9. As far as the environment can be treated as a purely
national good - for instance a river system specific to one
country - the country of origin principle can be applied.5
The trade-off between environmental quality as a public
consumption good and as a receptable of emissions from
production is then a purely national problem similar to the
endowment with other factors of production. Then,
environmental qualities may differ among countries, and
environmental policy instruments may differ as well.
Environmental policy instruments such as emission taxes or
pollution licences represent a cost factor and can be
interpreted as a production tax for pollution-intensive
activities. The country undertaking environmental policy
will negatively affect its comparative price advantage and
its absolute price advantage. Clearly, the loss of
comparative advantage represents an opportunity cost to the
country undertaking environmental policy. It can be left to
the political preferences of the individual European
country to what extent it wants to reduce its absolute and
comparative price advantage. The principle of the country
of origin can be applied. (Siebert 1987, Chap. 10).
10. Location arbitrage - an important ingredient of the
single market - implies that pollution-intensively
producing firms will move to the country with lower
environmental restraints increasing environmental stress
there.
However, the relocation of firms will not imply a competing
down of environmental quality for a number of reasons. The
nation negatively affected in its environmental quality by
attracting industry can use environmental policy
instruments in order to protect its environment. Since
marginal damages rise progressively with the level of
pollution, the country will quickly have an incentive to
undertake environmental policy. Moreover, the countries
attracting new industries should prevent the mistakes that
were made in the polluted regions. For instance, a country
may not fully utilize the assimilative capacity of its
environment in order to allow the location and expansion of
firms in the future. Thus, it may place an option value on6
assimilative capacity, not being used at a specific moment
of time. Finally, countries would be well advised to
explicitly consider the risk of environmental degradation
including irreversibilities in the sense of a preventive
principle.
Thus, only if one takes the position that the political
process of revealing national preferences is deficient one
can claim that the European Community would have to take
care of national interests. Only if there is a national
policy failure can Europe paternalize the national
interest. Of course, the presumption would be that a
European approach prevents the policy failure.
1)
Moreover, the location arbitrage of pollution-intensive
firms will imply a harmonization of the level of
environmental policy instruments by a competitive political
process. Emission taxes will rise in areas attracting
pollution-intensive activities or licences will be harder
to get. Thus, the incentives to avoid emissions will tend
to become similar in Europe. This also holds if there are
strong differences in environmental preferences between
European nations.
The subsidiary principle is consistent with the polluter-
pays-principle allowing a national evaluation of environ-
mental damages and determining the trade-off between
environmental damages and costs of abatements. Also, the
principle of preventive policy can be clearly applied by
the individual countries.
•*•) Such a presumption seems to be rather arrogant since
the democratic legitimation of European policy decisions
is - at the moment - rather small.Box It
Figure 1 in Box 1 illustrates the case of a difference in
abatement technology (and of marginal abatement costs, MC)
and in the level of initial pollution (OS). Country I has
both a higher level of emissions and more unfavorable
abatement cost. For simplicity, both countries have the
same marginal damage function (MD); Country I has to apply




Country I Country II
Figure 1
Figure 1 represents a snapshot of a given situation, i.e. a
short-run analysis. Over time, pollution-intensively
producing firms will migrate to country II. Moreover,
country II has a comparative advantage in pollution-
intensive activities so that more emissions will be
generated. Thus, OS* will be increased and the marginal
cost curve of abatement in country II- will shift to the
right. In country I, pollution-intensively producing firms
will leave the country or reduce their outputs. OS will be
reduced and the marginal cost curve of abatement will shift
to the left. In the long run, there is a tendency for
equalizing the emission tax (Figure 2).s*
Country I Country II
Figure 2
s*
Country I Country II
Figure 3Note again that location arbitrage will reduce the level of
pollution in the heavily polluted country; pollution in the
so far less polluted country will increase. Eventually, the
price for emissions will equalize.
If both countries have the same initial level of pollution
and the same abatement technology, but a different
evaluation of environmental quality (Figure 3), again a
differentiation of the price for environmental services is
necessary. Country I places a higher value on environmental
quality. This implies a higher price for environmental
services. Over time, firms will migrate to country II and
country II will specialize in the production of pollution-
intensively produced commodities. Emission taxes will tend
to equalize.
11. With national environmental policy for continuously
flowing emissions from production, the market for abatement
technology may be somewhat segmented. This, however, de-
pends on the policy instrument being used. If licencing is
the main policy instrument, differences in bureaucratic
settings are a factor of market segmentation. If prices for
environmental use such as emission taxes or transferable
discharge permits are applied, we only have a difference in
a price of an immobile factor (as a wage difference for
immobile labor). However, it can be expected that the best
practice of abatement will spread through Europe. Besides,
the abolition of the segmentation of the market of
abatement technologies seems not to yield sufficient
benefits to compensate the utility losses from an
unnecessary harmonization.
12. The question arises whether Europe needs a common
minimum ambient quality of the environment. It seems to me
that in the case of emissions continuously arising from
production and consumption activities, it can be left to10
the European nations to specify the ambient quality that
they want to have in their regions. It should be noted that
even assuming identical ambient quality standards the
policy instruments are not necessarily identical. Different
explicit or implicit prices for environmental use reflect
different scarcities of the environment. For instance, a
heavily polluted area requires higher emission taxes.
If one decides in favor of a common lowest denominator for
environmental quality in Europe, the individual country
still must have the option to strive for an environmental
quality higher than the common European minimum level.
Clearly, the policy instruments used in such a case by the
individual nation will differ. Again, differences in
licencing represent a stronger segmentation than dif-
ferences in prices for emissions (emission taxes, prices
for transferable discharge permits).
13. Emissions from stationary sources in the case of
consumption activities (heating homes) can be treated in
analogy to emissions from production. However, with the
amount of emissions at the individual source being rather
small, emission taxes and transferable emission licences
tend to be impracticable due to high monitoring costs.
Product norms for chimneys etc. are more likely. Product
norms, however, create trade barriers if they differ bet-
ween European nations, and markets are segmented.
Consequently, there is need for harmonization and the
philosophy of the country of origin principle cannot be
applied.
IV. Waste Disposal
14. Waste disposal activities are subject to the law of
comparative advantage. A specific country may have a com-
parative advantage in waste disposal for instance due to a
lower population density or due to geological conditions.
Insofar, national comparative advantage and specific11
national preferences can play. Again, environmental policy
can be decentralized unless one takes the position that
environmental policy in a country does not sufficiently
express the national interest, including the opportunity
costs for future generations. Thus again, only a national
policy failure may be possibly a reason for Europe to
paternalize national policy.
15. Vintage damages represent the mistakes of the past. In
the sense of the polluter pays principle, each nation
should take care of its vintage damages, for instance by a
national super fund.
V. Emissions from Non-Stationary Sources
16. Emissions from non-stationary sources (transportation)
require harmonization if the non-stationary sources can
move across borders. This is especially relevant because of
the deregulation of the transportation industry and the
resulting traffic flows. Here product norms for
transportation equipment is the relevant policy means.
These product norms have to be harmonized within Europe.
A specific issue is again to what extent it can be left at
the discretion of the individual country to apply
environmental policy instruments specific to its area.
Apparently, nationally differentiated product norms for
cars, planes etc. would impede European traffic; moreover,
trade barriers would be introduced. However, in addition to
harmonized product norms in Europe we cannot exclude
national taxes for pollution-intensive products (or
national subsidies for environmental - friendly products)
if we accept national preferences as a basis in a federa-
listic structure. Note, however, that national taxes or
subsidies only influence the stock of national
transportation equipment and cannot affect the movement of
vehicles across borders.12
VI. International Diffusion
17. Many environmental problems caused by stationary
sources are transfrontier problems (Rhine pollution, air
pollution like SO2). Then, unidirectional or two-
directional interactions between countries exist.
Environmental policy in Europe has to establish an
incentive mechanism that takes account of international
spillovers.
Incorporating international spillovers is relevant for two
reasons:
- The case of emissions from production (and consumption)
lends itself to regionalize environmental policy because
ambient levels of environmental policies in principle
must be defined for spatially limited environmental
systems. Spillovers, however, no longer allow a
decentralization.
- The relocation of industry adds to the potential of
international diffusion. Firms leaving one country in
reaction to stricter environmental policy may locate at
its border and send pollutants back to their original
country of residence via environmental media.
In the case of international spillovers, we have a clear
"externality". Consequently, institutional competition and
the country of origin principle cannot be applied. The
originator of damage shifts costs of abatement on the
country receiving the emissions and thus enjoys an
artificial advantage. Clearly, transfrontier represents a
distortion.13
Box 2;
Figure 4 in Box 2 illustrates the problem of international
spillover. For simplicity, we have assumed an identical
damage function and an identical cost of abatement function
for both countries. U and U are the points of intersection
of the damage and cost curves before an international
spillover occurs. By a spillover, country II reduces its
pollutants ambient in the environment by S S , and country
I experiences an increase SS'. Country II improves its
environmental quality at the disadvantage of country I.
An international diffusion norm would specify the allowable
ambient quality of the environment at the border. In
Figure 4, an international diffusion norm a is illustrated.
The polluter has to agree to carry marginal net cost
MC - MD : AB and the pollutee experiences the marginal
benefit MD - MC : XY. We know from the Coase theorem that
an efficient solution requires that marginal net cost and
marginal net benefit must balance. Figure 4 also
illustrates the absolute gain to the pollutee (UXY) and the
loss to the polluter (U AB). Here distributional aspects of
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Figure 414
18. In order to solve an international spillover, we
propose to specify the allowable level of an international
spillover, that is to establish an international diffusion
norm. A transfrontier diffusion norm specifies the ambient
quality of an environmental system (air, water) when it
crosses the border.
Diffusion norms have been used in national water quality
management for instance when the water quality of a tri-
butary (in Germany the Emscher) is specified where it
enters the main river (the Rhine). Thus, we have practical
experience with interregional diffusion norms which can
easily be extended to the European setting. Measurement
problems of pollutants ambient in the environment "at the
border" can be solved.
Once an agreement is reached, it can be left to the
national governments what type of policy instruments they
want to use in order to secure the international diffusion
norm. International diffusion norms therefore are
instrumental in decentralizing environmental policy in
Europe. This is an important advantage.
19. Agreement on international diffusion norms requires a
cooperative solution in which countries truly reveal their
preferences. The diffusion norm is determined by the
equality of the marginal benefit of the pollutee and the
marginal cost of the polluter assuming that the polluter
must pay.
Agreement on international diffusion seems extremely
difficult in practice as the discussion on solving the
transfrontier spillover in the Rhine shows. We have the
typical free rider behavior of the upstream polluter (or of
the polluter in the upwind location). Strategic behavior of
the upstream polluter overstating the abatement costs and
of the pollutee downriver overstating the damage usually15
can be observed. We thus have the problem of establishing
incentives to truly reveal information.
The polluter-pays-principle implies that not only the
individual polluter pays but that the nation that pollutes
the other nation pays. This principle may prove to be
impractical in transfrontier pollution. Here the pollutee
may have to make a transfer to the polluter to induce him
to abate pollutants. Thus, some type of a victim-pays-
principle may be mixed with the polluter-pay-principle.
20. If the governments of Europe cannot agree on
international diffusion norms, the alternative approach is
to reduce pollution generally in Europe in order to tackle
the diffusion problem. This is a rather coarse approach
implying a more centralized orientation of environmental
policy. Assume, for instance, one were to raise emission
taxes for SO2 generally in Europe in order to reduce the
level of pollutants ambient in the environment and thereby
reduce the transfrontier problem. Then, abatement clearly
would not be cost minimizing, and the costs of
environmental quality would be too high. Definitely, such
an approach would not be even second-best.
VII. Continental or Global Environmental Systems
21. In the case of international public goods such as the
North Sea or the Mediteranean, environmental quality cannot
be traced to individual polluters in the sense of uni- or
twOo-directional diffusion functions. This makes solutions
even more complicated.
A cooperative solution to an international public good
requires:
- An agreement on the quality of the public good.
- An agreement on national permissible discharge
quantities.16
In order to determine the optimal quantity of an
international public good, the countries must truly reveal
their preferences and their willingness-to-pay has to be
aggregated. This implies that the international
environmental system is interpreted as a public good that
is consumed in equal amounts by all nations. The individual
nation does not behave as a free rider (Box 3). Once the
quality target is fixed, one has to agree on the national
discharge quantities.
Note that an agreement on national permissible discharge
quantities is analogous to establishing international
diffusion norms.
Box 3;
In Figure 5, the optimal use of an international
environmental good is analyzed. It is assumed that two
countries use an environmental system as a public good. The
marginal willingness to pay and marginal abatement costs
differ among nations. The cooperative solution is at U (S)
where the aggregated marginal costs and marginal damage
curves intersect. If countries were to strive for the
purely individual positions, country I would abate SS' and
the *-country would abate S S '. The total reduction
(SS'+ S S ') is represented by point S yielding a much
lower environmental quality. Clearly, an uncoordinated
approach is inefficient. In a coordinated approach the two
countries would reach a higher environmental quality at S.
Moreover, if each country overstates its abatement costs or
plays down its evaluation of the damage, pollution would
at
even be higher than S.1718
As a practical approach, if the marginal willingness to pay
is not known, one could fix a quality target for the
international environmental system and then allocate
discharge quantities to the different countries. The
allocation of these emission rights can take into account
differences in wealth. Then, elements of the victim-pays-
principle enter the picture. Transferability of the
emission rights improves efficiency.
VIII. Pollutants contained in Consumption Goods
22. Environmental policy cannot only be treated as a
problem to control pollutants arising from production and
consumption activities. Pollutants may be contained in
products to be consumed; then product norms are the
relevant policy instrument. The potential for decentra-
lization depends on the evaluation of the pollutant
contained in the consumption good.
In some cases, we may argue that information on
the pollution content is sufficient to warn the
consumer. Then, pollutants are basically a private good
(or bad) and the Creme-de-Cassis verdict can be applied.
We leave it to the German consumer to drink beer not
produced according to the purity law of 1517. Why worry
about non-purities in other goods?
- Toxic pollutants and pollutants causing severe health
damages are another story. Here product qualities have
to be established in order to protect the consumer
unless one takes the position that it is the consumer's
problem to be informed on such pollutants. Product norms
represent market segmentation, and they have to be
harmonized throughout Europe. Again the issue of a
minimal quality in Europe and of a national deviation in
favor of a higher product quality arises.19
- The importance of product norms can be reduced if
liability rules can be established. With liability law,
the consumer affected by pollutants in a product can go
to court and court decisions will be anticipated by the
originator of a damage. Moreover, an insurance market
will develop; thus incentives are introduced to prevent
damages. However, transaction costs of liability rules
are high (Siebert 1989); harmonization of liability law
in Europe seems to be necessary in order to prevent
market segmentation, and this may prove to be extremely
difficult.
The case for or against product norms when pollutants are
contained in a product clearly depends on the concept of
consumer sovereignty. If a consumer is well informed and if
we can leave it to the consumer to be informed on product
quality over the full range (including toxic material) we
do not need product norms. If hazardous and toxic
pollutants are evaluated as a matter of policy concern,
then product norms become relevant. Product liability may
be a substitute for product norms.
IX. Environmental Accidents
23. Environmental accidents (Seveso, Bhopal, Sandoz)
represent another case in the casuistics of environmental
problems. Then liability issues are involved (Siebert
1987a, 1989). If environmental accidents would have a
national dimension, they could be left to national
environmental policy. However, one aspect of environmental
accidents is that they tend to have international
repercussions. Then, some form of harmonization of
liability rules become relevant.20
X. Summary: The Need for Harmonization
24. Table 1 summarizes the interrelation between environmental

























































































25. In this paper, we looked at some issues of
environmental policy in an integrated market. Environmental
policy should avoid to create new segmentations of markets
in Europe. Environmental policy may be a vehicle to segment
the European market against the world economy. This danger
is relevant especially when licencing and product norms are
used because they discriminate against non-European
competitors. Price instruments of environmental policy are
less damaging to the international division of labor.
26. We can summarize the results as follows.
- When the environment is national as a public con-
sumption good and as a recipient of wastes (continuous
emissions from production, waste disposal, vintage damage),
environmental policy can be decentralized in a single
European market. Differences in environmental endowments
and in political preferences will be reflected in different
prices for environmental services.
- If the dominating policy instrument is licensing by a
permit, national differences in licensing will segment the
market for the abatement industry and possibly establish
new market entry barriers. If prices for environmental
services (emission taxes, transferable discharge permits,
prices for disposal activities) are used, markets are not
segmented. We only have a price difference for an immobile
factor of endowment. Thus, European integration implies an
advantage of market incentives in environmental policy.
- Transfrontier spillovers can be controlled by inter-
national diffusion norms. This allows a decentrali-
zation of environmental policy in Europe.
- Environmental European systems require a politcal
agreement on environmental quality as a target and on
maximum national discharge quantities.23
- When product norms are the relevant policy instrument
and when the Creme-de-Cassis philosophy cannot be
applied due to externalities or due to a strong merit
argument such as toxidity, harmonization on a European
scale becomes necessary.
Environmental policy in the integrated market of Europe
should prevent the segmentation of national markets. But it
should also not be an instrument to segment Europe from the
world economy.24
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